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from CPP strongholds along the coast--which saw the most intensive and successful organizing efforts by the party. It is in Asante that the structure of the stranger community which gave birth to the MAPthe bonds which united it and the divisions which riddled it-is best documented by written and oral sources. It was in Asante that the MAP fought its fiercest battles, both on the streets and through the ballot boxes, and that its unique combination of class-based and religious appeals (and the contradictions inherent in those appeals) comes into sharpest relief. And it was here that the leadership of the MAP confronted directly their social and political impotence as a minority, as strangers in a strange land.
Life in the Zongo: The Terrain for Mobilization
Despite Islam's longer and more sustained influence on the Gold Coast's Northern Territories, the north would not give birth to the Muslim Association Party. The MAP would be a distinctly southern, urban phenomenon, rooted in the stranger communities or zongos of cities like Accra and Kumase. Though Muslims from the north maintained a presence in the south, particularly in Asante, for well over two centuries (Wilks, 1966 and 1975; Schildkrout, 1979) , it was not until after the British gained a firm footing in Asante at the turn of the century that the term zongo (Hausa for "camping place of a caravan") was brought into common usage and that the stranger communities of the southern cities began to be legally organized and defined by the British colonial authorities.
The zongo of Kumase was established by colonial statute in 1904 when the British designated a "Mohammedan quarter" of Kumasi. During the early years, the main settlers in the zongo were soldiers recruited from the north, from areas such as Hausaland and Mossi, who had helped the British defeat Asante during the Yaa Asantewa War of 1900. Also among the first migrants were traders-Hausa, Fulani, Mossi, Wangara, and Dagomba-who came from centralized states long influenced by Islam (Schildkrout, 1970: 256-7). While migration from these areas to the urban centers of the south continued through the 1950s, the spread and intensification of mining activities and cocoa farming led other groups from northern areas (from both within and outside of the present borders of Ghana) to migrate to the south for work. Unlike the earlier settlers, these people came not as soldiers or as traders, but as laborers and were often from noncentralized (often non-Muslim) communities such as Kusasi, Frafra, and Grunshi.
Over time, the internal organization of the zongo came to reflect the disparate backgrounds of this migrant community. Each ethnic group was led by a headman and maintained an informal political network. Historically, the Hausa headman (Serikin Hausa) was considered the central figure of authority in the zongo. This authority was legally sanctioned in 1927 by the British who declared the Hausa headman to be Serikin Zongo---chief of the zongo. Though this position was abolished in 1932 (only to be reinstituted by the CPP in 1958), the Hausa headman was still considered the leader of the zongo community by colonial officials, by the Asantehene and, to a lesser extent, by non-Hausas in the zongo (Ashanti Regional Office Files [AROF], 1949).5
The position of the zongo community with regard to the traditional structures of power in Asante has always been one of patronage and protection. Zongo residents were and are strangers (even if they have lived in the area for three generations) who must "pay allegiance to the Asantehene [King of Asante] as the 'owner of the land' and conscientiously greet him in a formal procession on festival occasions." Indeed, in the 1950s, when rumors spread that the CPP was going to attack the palace of the Asantehene, this allegiance was displayed dramatically. The Serikin Zongo, Ahmadu Baba, sent a zongo force to guard the Asantehene's palace 24-hours a day for three months (Schildkrout, 1970: 256; 1978: 208) .
Historically, the official functionary who has mediated between the strangers of the zongo and the Asantehene has been the Asante Nkramo Imam-head of the Asante Muslims. Quite distinct from the Muslims of the zongo, Asante Muslims come from those areas of the north conquered or annexed by Asante in the mid-18th century. They are not considered strangers and are under the direct authority of the Asantehene, via the Imam who, since the 1840s, has been considered a member of the nsumankwaafo or Court Physicians (Wilks, 1975: 81, 250, 278) . The distinction between the Asante Nkramo (Muslims) and the zongo Muslims has been more than an ethnic and chronological division, however. In the 1950s, a fierce political rivalry emerged as the Asante Nkramo remained ardent supporters of the CPP while their Muslim brothers in the zongo formed the rival MAP. 6 While Islam has not tended to bridge the gap, historically, between zongo residents and the Asante Nkramo, it has constituted a powerful homogenizing force within the zongo itself. In a stranger community consisting of a variety of ethnic groups and social classes, Islam has been the primary force for integration and unification. While many migrants to the south came as Muslims, others, particularly the more recent ones, converted to Islam upon settling in the zongo. For these migrants, from areas such as Talensi, Kusasi, and Dagati, conversion to Islam facilitated integration into the wider zongo community. This process of incorporation via Islam has thus helped forge a distinct zongo community. At the same time, it has reinforced the division between the strangers and their hosts. Asante Nkramo learned to speak Twi and became an integral part of Asante culture and society. The growth of the zongo community, however, and the role of Islam as the primary force of sociocultural integration within that community have increased the polarization (both social and cultural) between stranger and host (Schildkrout, 1974: 124-5; 1978: 90 ).
Yet Islam is not the only factor which has served to maintain the separation or distance between the zongo community and the host society. Of equal importance has been the economic factor. While the Asante Nkramo of the 18th and 19th centuries came as traders and clerics, the recent migrants to the urban areas of the south have come as unskilled laborers for the mines and cocoa farms and as petty traders. They are "the hewers of wood, the carriers of water"-an economically depressed and exploited class. There are obviously underprivileged elements within the larger host society and important exceptions to Price's characterization within the zongo itself-most notably among the leading headmen of the community. However, the general portrayal of the economic or class position of zongo residents is not an exaggeration and must be considered as a primary factor in reinforcing the polarization between the zongo and the rest of society. Indeed, it is only within the context of economic deprivation--coupled with the otherness of being both foreign and Muslim in culturally isolated communities-that life in the zongo and the politics of the Muslim Association Party can be understood.
The Rise of the MAP: Mobilizing the "Downtrodden"
The roots of the Muslim Association Party reach back to 1932 and the formation of the Muslim Association, an educational and social organization founded in Accra. For the first seven years of its existence, the Muslim Association was expressly apolitical. However, in 1939, it took a political stance by supporting the Mambii Party in the Accra municipal elections. According to Price, this move into the political arena was based on the fact that "Muslims felt there had been an unfair distribution of building materials following the damage caused by a severe earthquake in Accra earlier that year" (1954: 107-8). In the subsequent municipal election of 1942, the Muslim Association fielded a candidate of its own, Bankole Awooner-Renner. A non-Muslim, Awooner-Renner had turned to the Muslim Association after the dissolution of the radical, anti-imperialist West African Youth League.7 Successful in his candidacy, Awooner-Renner declared that he had cast his lot with the Muslim Association because he had felt the need to lead "the down-trodden, unrepresented and unrepresentable" (Asante, 1977: 208-9) .
As the politicization of Gold Coast Muslims continued apace in the years during and after World War II, Awooner-Renner would play a key role in shaping the appeals and tactics and in directing the course of his constituency. Denounced by George Padmore as a "prominent ideologist of Crypto-Communism" (Marable, 1987: 115) and described by one biographer as "an unrepentent socialist" (Asante, 1977) (Asante, 1977) . Based on his concern for the "down-trodden and unrepresented"--a concern which ignited a dynamic international career in socialist and pan-African movements-Awooner-Renner would play a leading role in mobilizing Muslims of the south on the basis of shared economic exploitation.
However, as the Gold Coast entered the postwar years of intense nationalist agitation, the specific grievances of Muslims were eclipsed by, or perhaps found expression through, the broader struggle for independence. In 1948 the Muslim Association declared its support for the newly formed UGCC. When Nkrumah led the mass break from the UGCC and formed the CPP, the Muslim Association, inspired by Awooner-Renner, threw its support behind Nkrumah. Indeed, Awooner-Renner, in those early days of mass nationalist mobilization, was one of the principal leaders of the CPP. In the end, it was a lesson and an inspiration that many anti-CPP Asantes took to heart as they began to prepare, in the ensuing months, to oppose the CPP on their own terms.11 It was the pace at which the MAP mobilized in Asante and the sympathetic reception it received from non-Muslims in that region which undoubtedly contributed to the leadership's decision to hold the party's first political conference in Kumase on 3 October 1953. The purposes of the conference were to consolidate the movement, revamp its organization, and set out its objectives-all in preparation for the upcoming elections in February and June. One of the meeting's first accomplishments was the establishment of three committees to "fight for the rights of Muslims"-a political-educational body, a cultural body and an economic body. In addition, a youth organization, intended to counter the CPP-inspired Muslim Youth Association, and a women's organization were formed (Pioneer, 15 and 28 October 1953). "To struggle for [Muslim] civil rights," Awooner-Renner explained, was the paramount concern of these affiliate organizations.
"Let nothing on earth shake your faith," he told the conference, "Come together. I believe that when Islam takes anything, it shall not fail. We shall not fail. We will march with the times no matter what obstacles beset us" (Pioneer, 5 and 16 October 1953).
Yet, some of those obstacles were formidable and the leadership of the MAP recognized early on that it faced more than the usual set of deterrents in its efforts at mobilization and organization. Unlike members of other political parties which were to emerge in opposition to the CPP, many members of the MAP were deportable as aliens. The threat of deportation always loomed on the horizon and, because many of the zongo headman active in the party were of foreign origin, it was a threat taken quite seriously. In the months before the election, the MAP was successful in mobilizing support within most of the zongo communities of the south. However, it failed to draw any significant support from the rest of the country. Even in the Northern Territories, with their large Muslim population, the party met with only limited success. Northerners considered the MAP to be as much a party of "strangers" as it was a party of Muslims. Moreover, because the MAP, during the early stages, concentrated its organizational efforts primarily on the south, when it made its move north, it was viewed as a southern import. As Price remarked on one of Awooner-Renner's visits to the north: Yet there were more substantive reasons for the MAP's routing in the 1954 general election, some of which were simply and directly a product of life in the zongo. The party suffered from a lack of finances and from a limited leadership. An economically depressed community, the zongo was not capable of financing an elaborate party network. Its pool of potential leaders was similarly limited by inferior, if not nonexistent, educational facilities and by simple language barriers-a situation that forced the party, on more than one occasion, to turn to non-Muslims.
Yet the most important factor in explaining the electoral failure of the MAP was the fact that it was perceived, above all else, as a Muslim party. Indeed, it was with fateful irony that Islam-the force which bound together the stranger communities and breathed fire into their nascent political struggle-became the MAP's greatest electoral liability. Many Ghanaians, as Price argues, though sympathetic to the aims of the MAP, feared that its activities would "result in the 'Pakistanisation' of the Gold Coast" (1956: 34). Aware of these concerns, the party consistently tried to transcend its religious basis and professed on more than one occasion that the Muslim Association Party is only a name that has been given to a political party and does not signify that only Muslims could join.
. In the final analysis, the MAP was stuck between a rock and a hard place when it came to mobilizing support for the general election outside the stranger communities. Muslims in the Northern Territories viewed the party as a southern import with its own particular agenda and aspirations. Non-Muslims in the south viewed it as a northern or foreign-inspired party, named after a "foreign" religion and with a base among politically and educationally "backward" strangers. Though the MAP's charges of corruption against the CPP and its upholding of the sanctity of chieftancy struck a few resonant chords among the opposition forces of the Gold Coast and though the MAP consistently professed it was a national movement, it was viewed by most people in the broader society as a government's freezing of the price of cocoa in August 1954. Less than a month later, after intensive protests by farmers-protests supported by the MAP-the Asante NLM burst on the scene not only demanding an increase in the cocoa price but asserting the rights of Asantes to selfdetermination in an independent Gold Coast.17 The emergence of the NLM served to revitalize the entire opposition to the CPP, but especially the MAP. The day before the Asante movement was inaugurated, Awooner-Renner told an audience in Kumase that a year earlier the MAP "had seen some cloud darkening the horizon and gave the warning but ... [was not] heeded. But thank God, others had now come to realise the danger the MAP had pointed out." The party wanted to assure Asantes, he continued, "that whether it rains or snows, shines or otherwise, we shall stand firmly by your side." He concluded by announcing that the "CPP had wanted to ban the MAP. Now the CPP was being banned in Ashanti" (Pioneer, 21 September 1954) .
Over the next months the NLM became the focus and the vanguard of extra-parliamentary opposition to the CPP. Less than a year after it was inaugurated, a number of opposition groups merged their identities with the Asante movement. The MAP, however, opted not to merge, arguing that it was not "prepared to forgo its political identity under any circumstances" (Daily Graphic, 20 September 1955). As Alfa Lardan recalled, "We had to keep the MAP to protect our interests" (Allman, 1984 In short, though Islam provided the specific rallying cry for mobilization, it was for mobilization around issues which reflected the gen-eral civil and class antagonisms of colonial Gold Coast society. Thus, the means of mobilizing support may have been sectarian, but the issues which instigated political activity clearly were not. Perhaps no one understood this better than Awooner-Renner. He remained a socialist and a pan-Africanist throughout his entire life, yet he saw no contradiction between his political philosophy and his attempts to organize the exploited through religious appeals. Islam, in his eyes, was an effective weapon of mobilization against economic exploitation, as well as religious prejudice.
Yet the sort of sectarian mobilization utilized by the MAP and the myriad of opposition groups which followed did not provide a solution to the problem of organizing the exploited to fight against their exploitation. One of the more fateful antinomies running through Ghanaian, or perhaps African, politics generally, is that mobilization along these lines not only precluded broad-based organizational efforts, but bound the exploited masses to existing traditional authority structures. In such a situation, the specific interests of the traditional powers were destined to prevail. Thus, as Awooner-Renner's experiences reveal, that very weapon of mobilization-Islam-which had proven so successful as a tool for organizing the "unrepresented," at one and the same time, undercut attempts to broaden the party's base along class lines and bound the existing base of support-the strangers of the zongo-to their conservative rulers. The power of those rulers over the men and women of the stranger community was never threatened or put into question. When the zongo leaders in Asante subordinated the struggle of the MAP to that of their Asante hosts-in an act which affirmed the common interests of traditional rulers, whether stranger or host-there was nothing AwoonerRenner could do. Islam was, in the end, a double-edged sword. Because of the thirty-year rule governing the release of documentation, archival research by historians on the final years of colonial rule and the transition to independence is still in its infancy. Much of this research is only now reaching publication, but already has given rise to a very serious debate over the nature and limitations of colonial documentation. Richard Crook (1986) outlined the substance of this debate when he argued that the opening of the imperial archives has led to a "shift of emphasis" in historical writing away from mass nationalist movements and back to imperial policy-"even to the extent of asserting that imperial policy was the prime mover" in the decolonization process. This article is not a part of the trend described by Crook for two reasons. 
